Finland’s future antiaircraft missile solution
By Pauli Thomenius - Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff (retired)
Pauli Thomenius is a
retired antiaircraft defense lieutenant colonel who has served
as an instructor at the National Defence College and as missile
battery command in the Helsinki Antiaircraft Regiment, since
disbanded. Thomenius investigated the NASAMS system and
interviewed Kongsberg representatives in Kongsberg in October
2008.
The Finnish government will spend approximately € 500 million on a new system to replace its current medium-range antiaircraft solutions, which include the Russian manufactured semiactive radar homing Buk (SA-11) system, and the French-manufactured Crotale system. [Add additional content on the current Finnish solutions? Note I have not mentioned the Marksman system nor the shoulder-fired missile systems here.]
On Nov 7, 2008, MTV 3 news announced that NASAMS had won the competition for the medium-range antiaircraft missile system. According to the Ministry of Defence however, the competition goes on. Of the original competitors with NASAMS, there is only one serious choice left: the French/Italian SAMP/T. NASAMS and SAMP/T are very different systems. The reasons for these differences are different views on the threat in the air and the nature of war. The systems are for different tasks. If the final choice is done on military and not political grounds, the selection also indicates what the future doctrine of Finnish air defence will be. The 500 million euros available will purchase a certain amount of SAMP/T units, and likely about twice the amount of NASAMS equipment. Both systems are in operational use, as required by the Finnish criteria.
Given the current lack of transparency in the systems’ costs, due to factors such as competition, discounts for allies, and counter trade, it is hard to say precisely how much any given system will cost. The expenditure for the missiles has definitely gone up over the years, that much is certain. It can be estimated that the cost of a single missile now is 1/2 to 1 million US dollars.
The Norwegian NASAMS missile system is a strong contender in Finland’s search for a new solution. First, it meets the Finnish criteria, which include that the system is completed and in use in a European country other than the country of manufacture. In addition to Norway, the NASAMS system is in service in Spain and the United States of America. It will soon enter service in the Netherlands. Further, Greece and Turkey have the same fire control component as the NASAMS system, as well as the standardised information systems associated with it. Sweden has also acquired the same control centre for its international operations. Finland could be acquiring at least a half dozen, but likely less than 10 NASAMS, in terms of traditional batteries.
The system uses the same air-to-air AMRAAM missiles, surface launched in this case, as used by the F/A 18 Hornets flown by the Finnish Air Force. The missiles and radar in the NASAMS system are designed and developed by Raytheon of USA. Other important parts, such as the networked infrastructure, which is one of the novel aspects of the system, and the software, come from Kongsberg of Norway. Thus the system is strongly NATO compliant.
Does the range match the threat?
Vidar M Skjelstad, a retired major of the Norwegian Air Force and Vice President Business Development, Integrated Defence Systems, Konsberg, discussed the target profile that influenced the design decisions behind NASAMS. In this view, the threat from traditional manned units, including helicopters, is declining, while the threat from cruise missiles and drones is growing.
In the Norwegian target analysis, antiaircraft missiles must be prepared to shoot down unmanned drones, cruise missiles, helicopters, and fighter-bombers. The likely engagement range is a lot shorter then the 40 km of the Hawk missile system that Norway deployed previously. Based on their experience, Kongsberg representatives claim that the greatest practical range has been between 10 and 14 km. This range is easy for the Raytheon AMRAAM. Depending on the situation, the effective range of the missile is about 25 km. The effective range from a vertical firing position is at most 10 km.
Previous antiaircraft systems included a need for close-in defence to protect the missile platforms and other components. In effect, there needed to be an antiaircraft defence for the antiaircraft defence. One expert view holds that "close range gaps in missile systems must be handled by smaller weapons - you are helpless when you cannot shoot at close range." However, this applies only to systems with a slow rate of fire and/or that are sensitive to radar shadows.
NASAMS also has radar shadows and close range gaps for individual missile platforms, but targets cannot get into close range gaps, as they are shot down earlier due to rapid rates of fire. This takes away one argument about the need for close in defence from the antiaircraft fundamentalists. The NASAMS system does not have a traditional "black hole." The equipment in the system can be distributed over an area kilometres or blocks in size. One platform can cover the close-range gap of another platform. For example, the 23 mm cannons ubiquitous in Finland are not required in such a setup. Machine guns have no more effect on aerial targets than sound effects, although the same equipment is effective against surface targets.
Traditional antiaircraft doctrine states that the AA mission is accomplished when the target cannot complete its mission. The existence of an antiaircraft network and disruptive fire is enough. In the opinion of this author, this "flock shooting" was misguided already 10 years ago. Targets must be shot down, otherwise no one would fear or avoid air defenses. Unfeeling and fearless robots such as cruise missiles and drones only care about hitting their targets. A near miss is the same thing as missing. The essential issue is to destroy the target, everything else is but a dream. In a time of unmanned machines and cruise missiles it is even irresponsible.
The networked principle
A battery or section traditionally has a fire control centre that commands the missile platforms and missiles under its control. If the control center is struck off line, the entire unit goes off line. The Norwegian solution organises its system differently: it constructs a network. There are several radars, several fire control centres, and a group of platforms. A firing solution can be calculated dynamically from any of the components in the network. One radar, one fire control center and one or more platforms can be put to work. These units can be 500 m, 5 km, 10 km, 100 km, or even further apart. Naturally the missile platform cannot be in Jyväskylä, if the target is over Helsinki 250 km away. However, the sensors can be placed far away from the protected area.
The NASAMS system is very networked. All sorts of combinations work without the commander needing to separately connect them. Alternatively, the commander can directly determine who directs the fire and who fires. The system can also be set up to be completely automated, where it would fire a missile at a target identified as hostile from a platform selected as suitable for the situation by sensors. In the basic solution, the system would always select a suitable combination itself. Of course, there must always be one radar, one fire control centre and one platform at minimum. Of course, the radar can also be replaced by target data coming from outside the system. For example, an AWACS or naval networked monitoring system can provide the data, or the own passive sensors in the NASAMS system, if the weather and the target situation allow its use as a replacement for radar. At its best, the system could work independently of its own radar, either completely or in a partially passive mode. This increases sustainability in combat. Target data can be received by heat sensors from surprisingly long ranges. Of course, this requires favorable weather conditions.
A dispersed anti-air system
NASAMS is thus a network of sensors, datalinks, and missile platforms where the target data can be delivered to any part for use. Before firing, the missiles are given directions and where they begin to seek the target with their own radar or with target data from external sensors. The current Finnish fire control system does not provide targeting data with sufficient precision.
Finnish tactics typically calls for dispersed combinations and the deployment of forces in many locations. The NASAMS system tolerates this dispersal better than many other systems. At a minimum one fire control section and one platform form a section that is ready for operations.
One radar is enough in other systems. However, there are a number of operational matters to consider: including survivability in combat situations, avoiding radar jamming, and rotating between radars to avoid radar signal seeking missiles. Additionally, radar shadows present in any normal operating environment must also be taken into account. When there are multiple radars in the system, they can be grouped into arrays. In general, radar shadows are not a problem in the NASAMS network.
The reaction time of NASAMS is good. There is always a platform pointed more or less in the direction of an approaching target. The flight time to the target is not long for a missile traveling at many times the speed of sound. Of course this is of not great significance since the missile is a fire-and-forget solution. The equipment on the ground is not tied to guiding the missile, unlike in the Buk system for example. With Buk, the target is illuminated by the radar during the flight time of the missile, and the missile acquires its target from the returning radar signal. NASAMS missiles have radar, through which the missile acquires its target in fully active mode, without tying up the equipment on the ground.
Challenging target environment
Generally, the longer the range of a missile, the bigger the close range gap. With a smaller gap in the firing solution, there is generally time to shoot at more targets. NASAMS does not have the smallest close range gap in its firing solution. Its missiles are fired at a 30 degree angle of elevation and it takes some time before the missile can maneuver after its launch. However, NASAMS has a high rate of fire, so that it does not seem that it would be forced into un-optimal firing solutions. Unlike with many semiactive radar homing missiles where the radar is released from the target only when the missile has scored a hit, the NASAMS radars scan the entire time for other targets. The antenna of the radar spins the entire time on a two to three second cycle.
A target in a radar shadow is an impossible challenge for semiactive radar homing missiles. The equipment on the ground cannot light up targets behind a hill. The launch of a NASAMS missile provides an opportunity to fix on a target flying in a radar shadow. (Also the heat seeking shoulder fired missiles followed targets although they flew into a shadow!) The networked nature of NASAMS helps it penetrate shadows by using radar arrays or other sensors. Switching radars also deals with possible evasive maneuvers intended to dodge radar signals.
Perhaps a more common solution for radars is to launch a radar seeking missile. However, radar in the NASAMS network can be rotated randomly or purposefully. A radar seeking missile is not launched if the transmission from the radar stops in time. In addition, the sensor network can survive losses as long as there is at least one connection to a source that provides sufficiently precise targeting data. It is true that a radar seeking missile that has already launched will continue onwards even if the radar is switched off while the missile is in flight. However, NASAMS is fortunately not dependent on one radar, or even two.
Competing systems, capabilities
A SAMP/T unit has a surveillance and targeting radar, a command centre and 2-4 platforms with 8 Aster 30 missiles. The logic of the system is different than that of NASAMS, but both missile solutions are of the fire-and-forget type. The SAMP/T range is clearly longer, including to a higher vertical range. The range is 60 km, and the vertical range is 20 km. When the competitors have such a great different ranges, there must be other tradeoffs, otherwise they would not be in the same competition. With the survivability in combat conditions, networking and modularity also as selection criteria, NASAMS makes up for its shorter range.
The datalinks in the systems for furthering targeting information, also known as the missile-up-link, also differ from each other. NASAMS has link antennas on each platform. In SAMP/T, the link antennas are associated with the Arabel radars and guide the missiles of all platforms. The platform links in NASAMS only direct the six missiles of their own platform. There are many links in order to promote survivability in combat situations.
When it comes to saturation, the one radar of the SAMP/T system does not seem to handle targets at the same rate as a NASAMS network. But it does not need to, if SAMP/T begins to fire at a longer range and this is able to handle a larger number of targets, when the targets come in at a sufficient height. There is no clear difference in saturation issues between the systems are at their best.
This is a serious competition as neither system is competing on references and price. If the defence considerations of both systems are drawn up, SAMP/T clearly wins. It is also good to recall that the current Buk equipment receives as fine a review as NASAMS when it comes to range and defence capabilities. The manufacturer of SAMP/T claims that its system is also suited to ballistic missile defence. Kongsberg, the NASAMS manufacturer, does not even attempt such a thing with its missiles. Here is one difference between the systems and their underlying approaches. In the opinion of some antiaircraft experts, the goal of defending against ballistic missiles is such a technically expensive goal that it is not worth seriously investing in.
Who Chooses?
If those in the field choose, NASAMS wins, as it is closer to the old Finnish doctrine. But, what influence will European solidarity have? Or, what will be the impact of synergy, as the missile is the same as the Hornet air-to-air missile? Use of the same missile can also be thought of negatively, as Finnish air defence will be flying on one "wing". An opponent only to neutralise one threat profile.
What will be the impact of the amount of equipment that can be gotten with the same money? What influence will the personnel requirements have, particularly if the trend is towards professionalisation in Finland in the future? What will be the impact of the new network thinking? And survivability in combat? And countertrade? What will be the impact of the politicians, who in the final analysis will make the decision?
